IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BAY CAPITAL FINANCE, LLC,

:

Plaintiff,

: C. A. No.

: 2019-0539-KSJM

BARNES AND NOBLE EDUCATION, INC., : MICHAEL P. HUSEBY, EMILY CHIU, DANIEL : DEMATTEO DAVID GOLDEN, JOHN RYAN, : JERRY SUE THORNTON, and DAVID WILSON, :

:

Defendants.

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Chancery Courtroom No. 12B Leonard L. Williams Justice Center 500 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware Wednesday, August 14, 2019 1:30 p.m.

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BEFORE HON. KATHALEEN St.J. McCORMICK, Vice Chancellor

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## RULINGS OF THE COURT ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street - Suite 11400
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 255-0523

THE COURT: We're back. Any settlement during the recess? If not, I'm prepared to deliver a ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff, Bay Capital Financial, LLC, or "Bay Capital," as I'll refer to it, filed this lawsuit seeking relief in connection with the 2019 annual meeting of defendant Barnes and Noble Education, Inc., which I'll refer to simply as "the company."

On June 27, 2019, Bay Capital noticed the nomination of a slate of director candidates for election at the company's annual meeting. Bay Capital's notice was timely, as June 27, 2019, was the notice deadline under the company's bylaws, but as of June 27, Bay Capital was just a beneficial owner of company stock and not a record holder. Under the company's bylaws, a stockholder must be a record holder as of the notice deadline in order to nominate directors. Because Bay Capital had not met this requirement, the company rejected Bay Capital's nomination.

Bay Capital's complaint, filed on July
15, 2019, seeks injunctive relief to permit Bay

Capital to run its slate of directors at the 2019
annual meeting. Bay Capital moved to expedite its
claims toward a preliminary injunction hearing.

On its motion to expedite, Bay Capital acknowledged that it was not a record holder as of June 27, 2019, but argued that the company should not be permitted to enforce that deadline, given a conflict between the company's August 2018 proxy statement and the advance notice bylaw at issue. Specifically, the method set forth in the bylaws for computing the relevant deadline conflicts with the method disclosed in the 2018 proxy for computing that deadline.

The company's bylaws peg the relevant deadline to the prior year's annual meeting, requiring notice and corresponding record holder status "not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting." By contrast, the company's August 2018 proxy statement pegs the deadline to the forthcoming annual meeting, requiring notice not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days prior to that meeting. The proxy does not mention the record holder requirement.

According to Bay Capital, the 2018 proxy creates the impression that a stockholder need not submit notice until after the meeting date is announced. Because, as of June 27th, the company had not yet announced to its stockholders the date of the 2019 meeting, Bay Capital did not believe that deadline applied, I was told.

Bay Capital made other arguments at the expedition phase, but it was on this theory that I deemed Bay Capital's claims colorable and on which I granted the motion to expedite toward a preliminary injunction hearing. At the company's request, I set today, August 14, as the hearing date to permit the company to maintain its plan to hold its annual meeting on September 25, 2019, regardless of the outcome of Bay Capital's motion.

The parties engaged in expedited discovery. That discovery revealed Bay Capital's factual allegations to lack foundation. Bay Capital is thus not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of its claims, and I am denying the motion.

Now I'm going to go back and fill in the relevant events prior to June 27 that result in this outcome.

The company operates physical and virtual bookstores for educational institutions, sells textbooks wholesale, and provides digital educational solutions. The company was spun off from Barnes & Noble, Inc. in August of 2015 and is publicly traded. The company's current board of directors comprises the seven individuals named as directors in this action. Michael Huseby, the company's CEO, is the only inside director. The other six members are independent outside directors.

Bay Capital was formed in 2018 to make investments on behalf of its principal, Sunil Suri.

We do not know much about Bay Capital. It has no website, no SEC registration or filings or other publicly available information about its team or history, and candidly, Mr. Suri obstructed discovery into Bay Capital in the course of this litigation.

For example, during his deposition, in response to a straightforward question asking the value of assets controlled, held, or owned by Bay Capital, Mr. Suri responded, "between one dollar and as much as a billion dollars." This sort of response went on for pages. He also purported to lack the ability to narrow that range.

At a social lunch in mid-2018, 1 2 Mr. Suri told Mr. Huseby that he desired to buy the 3 company. Mr. Huseby instructed Mr. Suri that if he 4 were interested, he should hire advisors, review 5 publicly available information, and contact the board. 6 Mr. Huseby repeated this message at a later meeting 7 with Mr. Suri. 8 Mr. Suri did not take this advice but, 9 instead, embarked on a course of conduct that -- to 10 Mr. Huseby, at least -- diminished Mr. Suri's 11 credibility. Mr. Huseby recounts that Mr. Suri texted 12 him to obtain information about the company and advice 13 on how to approach the shareholders, among other 14 things. This caused the company's general counsel to 15 write Mr. Suri's counsel on February 1, 2019, stating 16 that Mr. Suri's unsolicited outreach was concerning, requesting that Mr. Suri refrain from any further 17 18 communications with Mr. Huseby, and requesting that 19 further communications be directed to counsel. 20 After receiving the general counsel's 21 February 1, 2019, communication, Mr. Suri, on behalf 22 of Bay Capital, then submitted three unsolicited 23 proposals to purchase the outstanding equity in the

company. Those proposals were submitted on February

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7, June 7, and June 27, 2019.

In response to the first offer, the company's board of directors engaged in diligence and consulted with advisors. On March 8, 2019, the board rejected the proposal, primarily for two reasons. First, the board determined the financial consideration to be inadequate. Second, the board believed that Mr. Suri was not a credible potential acquirer. The board based its determination in part on Mr. Huseby's interaction with Mr. Suri.

The board also had concerns about Mr. Suri's professional background based on a report from an independent third-party investigator that identified lawsuits and outstanding judgments against Mr. Suri and his companies, among other things. The investigator was also unable to find anything connecting Mr. Suri to the education publishing or education technology sectors in which the company operates.

The board further had doubts about Mr. Suri's ability to finance an acquisition of a public company. Mr. Suri's February 7 offer letter was vague on this point. The June 7 and June 27 offers were each for less financial consideration than

the ones that preceded them, and the board rejected them for the same reasons that the board rejected the initial proposal.

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In the same time period that Mr. Suri was submitting the proposals to acquire the company, Mr. Suri was being advised on other potential acquisition strategies, including possibly nominating a slate of directors. The company's bylaws establish requirements for nominating director candidates. The bylaws require that a stockholder's notice of nomination of director candidates be delivered "not less than 90 days ... prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting."

The bylaw also requires that the nominating stockholder be "a holder of record ... at the time of giving of the notice" and "entitled to vote" at the meeting at which the election takes place. The company's bylaws are publicly filed and available online.

The company's 2018 annual meeting was held on September 25, 2018. Thus, to submit director nominations for the 2019 annual meeting timely, a stockholder must have become a holder of record and

provide the company with valid notice by June 27, 2019.

As it turns out, Mr. Suri was well advised and aware of the bylaw requirements. On April 18, 2019, Citi made a presentation to Mr. Suri concerning what the presentation described as friendly versus hostile strategies for acquiring the company. In an analysis of the company's defense profile based on a review of the company's bylaws, Citi identified the company's advance notice requirement as a potential "Limit on Ability to Change the Board."

Citi explained the bylaw requirements that

"nominations and proposals must be received between 90 and 120 days prior to the first anniversary of the preceding year's annual meeting."

Mr. Suri was deposed in this action.

I have reviewed the deposition transcript. Candidly, it provides a good example of how a representative of a corporation, particularly a corporation seeking expedited aid of this Court, should not behave. At his deposition, Mr. Suri testified that he received Citi's presentation and recalled reviewing the factors listed in its "Defense Profile" analysis.

In June 2019, Mr. Suri sought advice

from Daniel Gordon of GLD Partners, LP. On June 12, after reviewing the company's bylaws, Mr. Gordon suggested that Bay Capital could "nominate a replacement slate of Directors to be voted on at the next annual meeting. That replacement slate would then presumably vote in favor of the sale of the Company."

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Mr. Gordon further explained that in order to make a nomination, Bay Capital had to become a stockholder of record. He wrote: "It is important that we become a shareholder and instruct the brokerage firm to designate us as 'record holder' of the shares. Even if it is just 1,000 shares, it is essential that our name appear as a shareholder on the Company's shareholder registry (instead of having our shares lumped in with other customers of Merrill Lynch). Whichever brokerage firm you use can take the steps necessary to designate us as the 'record holder' for the shares if they are specifically directed to do so."

Mr. Suri responded to this email on

June 12. He wrote: "Brilliant." Bay Capital did not

own company stock at the time, so Mr. Suri stated that

he was "actioning the purchase of shares" to be held

"in the name of Bay Capital." Bay Capital, however, did not purchase company shares that day.

On June 16, Mr. Gordon sent Mr. Suri an email flagged as high importance attaching a copy of the company's bylaws in which he had "highlighted certain relevant sections pertaining to the nomination of directors." In the cover email, Mr. Gordon wrote and emphasized that a nominating stockholder must be a record holder and that the bylaws required that notice of nomination be delivered to the company "not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting."

Mr. Gordon then spelled out precisely what this meant for Bay Capital. He wrote: "The preceding annual meeting took place on September 25, 2018. Therefore, our Notice would need to be served on [the Company's] Secretary no later than June 25, 2019."

Note that Mr. Gordon incorrectly computed the deadline, stating that the deadline was June 25 instead of June 27, and thus Mr. Suri was advised to become a record holder two days prior to the actual deadline.

Mr. Suri, who testified at his deposition that he recalled receiving and reviewing the email, responded on June 16 indicating that he agreed with the assessment and informing Mr. Gordon that he would purchase company shares "this week." In fact, Bay Capital did not purchase shares that week.

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On June 19, Mr. Gordon reminded
Mr. Suri that in order to nominate a slate of
directors, Bay Capital needed to be a record holder of
shares in the company. Mr. Suri responded that same
day indicating that "the shares are being bought."
But Bay Capital did not purchase company shares on
June 19.

On June 20 and 21, Mr. Gordon again reminded Mr. Suri of the record holder requirement. He further reminded that the nomination letter needed to be delivered "by June 25, 2019 so as to be considered timely under the Company's By-laws." Again, Mr. Gordon included the incorrect earlier deadline. Again, Bay Capital did not purchase company shares on June 20 or June 21.

Following his June 20 and June 21 emails, Mr. Gordon again reminded Mr. Suri of "the need for Bay Capital to be listed as a shareholder of

record. Without this status [the Company] can reject the nomination notice."

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The record reflects that despite being reminded no fewer than four times by Mr. Gordon of the record holder requirement set forth in the bylaws, Mr. Suri waited until June 24, 2019, to place an order for company shares. He placed that order with a broker at JPMorgan. Purchasing shares through a broker and then directly registering those shares in the purchaser's name, such that the purchaser becomes the holder of record, takes time. The settlement of a trade -- that is, the official transfer of cash and securities -- may take days. After a trade has settled, the broker must submit a request to a transfer agent through the Direct Registration System, or "DRS," which then takes a number of days. Because Mr. Suri waited until June 24, despite being advised otherwise, to place an order for the company shares, Bay Capital did not become a stockholder of record by the June 27, deadline.

When asked for an explanation of these events during his deposition, Mr. Suri testified that the need to be a record holder by the deadline for director nominations made "zero difference to me." He

explained, "I am doing the company a favor." It was a contentious deposition. This statement was made toward the end of what seemed like a very long day.

Still, the response is credible.

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Around noon on June 27, Mr. Gordon informed Mr. Suri that "we will not have shares in record name prior to the close of business today." Although Mr. Suri knew Bay Capital was not the stockholder of record on June 27, and notwithstanding Mr. Gordon's admonition that Bay Capital cannot submit a timely nomination under the bylaws, Mr. Suri submitted to the company on June 27 a purported nomination notice which represented incorrectly that as of that moment, Bay Capital was a record holder of shares.

During his deposition, Mr. Suri did testify that at the time he submitted the June 27 letter, he did not understand the distinction between holding stock in street name versus being a record holder. That might explain the inaccurate representation. Nevertheless, the statement was inaccurate, and the inaccuracy was no fault of the company's.

The company received the notice of

nomination sometime after 3 p.m. on June 27. In response, the company's general counsel consulted with the company's outside counsel, the proxy solicitor, and transfer agent "to determine as a legal matter whether Bay Capital was the stockholder of record" as of June 27, as had been represented by Bay Capital.

The board of directors met telephonically on June 28 to discuss the issue. Following consultation with its advisors, the board unanimously agreed that Bay Capital's June 27 nomination did not comply with the company's bylaws. On June 28, the company's outside counsel sent Bay Capital a letter explaining the issue and writing that the June 27 nomination notice was invalid under the company's bylaws.

Capital was in a bind and needed a solution. In the same June 27 email informing Mr. Suri that Bay Capital would not be a record holder by the close of business on June 27, Mr. Gordon identified the discrepancy between the company's advance notice bylaw and the summary description of that bylaw in the company's 2018 proxy statement. Because the 2018 proxy states that the deadline is 90 days prior to the next annual

meeting, Mr. Gordon suggested that Bay Capital "submit our nomination today" -- that is, on June 27 -- "and then resubmit it ... and argue that we were in compliance with the proxy language."

None of the prior communications between Mr. Suri and Mr. Gordon or any other advisors regarding the company's bylaws requirements mention the company's 2018 proxy statement language. The record reflects that this issue was first raised only when Bay Capital had realized that Mr. Suri's delay in purchasing company stock resulted in Bay Capital missing the record holder deadline. Indeed, during his deposition, Mr. Suri testified that he was not aware of the discrepancy between the proxy statement and the company's bylaws prior to June 27.

On June 29, Mr. Gordon proposed to Mr. Suri that the newly discovered discrepancy between the bylaws and the 2018 proxy statement be used as part of a litigation strategy to "ratchet up the pressure on" the company and force a settlement. Bay Capital followed Mr. Gordon's plan.

On July 1, Bay Capital sent the company a so-called "updated" notice of stockholder nomination. An exhibit to that notice confirmed that

Bay Capital was not a record holder until June 28.

Shortly thereafter, on July 1, Bay Capital's outside counsel sent the company's counsel a communication claiming that "Bay Capital relied on the Company's proxy disclosure in formulating its plans and timing ...."

As should be clear by now, the statement was not totally accurate. Indeed, it seems slightly misleading. Discovery in this action reflected and revealed that Bay Capital was not aware of the language in the 2018 proxy disclosure prior to June 27, 2019, when it had discovered that it was already untimely.

Bay Capital commenced this litigation on July 15, repeating this inaccurate statement of reliance.

Before turning to the analysis, it
bears mention that the company set a date for the 2019
annual meeting back in October of 2018. It was
described as tentative, for sure, and in June 2019,
the company's board of directors passed resolutions
firming down the September 25, 2019, date. That date,
and the timing of the company's actions to
preliminarily and then finally select that date, were

consistent with the company's historical practice. 1 2 Bay Capital contends otherwise. I have carefully 3 reviewed the documents on which Bay Capital relies to 4 arque that the setting of the date was motivated by 5 Bay Capital's actions. The evidence is unsupportive, 6 in my view. 7 With that, I'll turn now to the legal 8 analysis. Bay Capital seeks a preliminary injunction, 9 which is an extraordinary remedy. As this Court 10 explained in Cantor Fitzgerald L.P. v. Cantor, a 11 preliminary injunction is "granted sparingly and only 12 upon a persuasive showing that it is urgently 13 necessary, that it will result in comparatively less 14 harm to the adverse party, and that, in the end, it is 15 unlikely to be shown to have been issued 16 improvidently." 17 To obtain a preliminary injunction, as 18 this Court explained in Next Level Communications, 19 Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., the moving party bears the 20 burden of demonstrating three things: "(1) a 21 reasonable probability of success on the merits at a 22 final hearing; (2) that the failure to issue a

preliminary injunction will result in immediate and

irreparable harm; and (3) that the harm to the

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plaintiffs if relief is denied will outweigh the harm
to the defendants if relief is granted." These
elements are conjunctive, such that any failure of
proof on one of the elements will defeat the
application.

I will now turn to the first element and consider whether Bay Capital has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits at a final hearing on its claims. In support of its motion, Bay Capital advances a number of arguments for why the June 27 deadline should not be enforced.

First, Bay Capital argues that it was entitled to rely on the proxy statement and that the correct deadline is 90 days before the actual meeting takes place.

This argument fails for a few reasons. For starters, there's no factual basis for the assertion of reliance. As I detailed when reciting the factual record, Bay Capital has not demonstrated that it relied on the proxy language in planning or timing its nomination. The record reflects that the opposite is true and that Bay Capital relied on the bylaws.

Bay Capital was fully aware of the

advance notice bylaw, was advised timely and repeatedly that it must be a record holder to notice its nomination, and was even advised to become a record holder by June 25, two days before the actual deadline. Bay Capital's representative acknowledged receiving this advice. He either ignored it or simply didn't understand it, the record is unclear. Either way, the company cannot be faulted.

Moreover, the argument misses the point, because computing the deadline in accordance with the proxy statement, as Bay Capital requests, results in the same deadline imposed by the bylaws, which is June 27, 2019. To obtain a later deadline, Bay Capital would have to persuade the Court to require the company to reschedule the annual meeting currently set for September 25, 2019.

at least it argued in its reply brief -- that the company set the annual meeting at an earlier date than ever in the company's history. But as I previously stated, the extensive factual record reflects that the meeting date was set in accordance with the company's historical practices and on a clear day before any dispute arose with Bay Capital. So Bay Capital's

contention is simply unsupported.

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As its next argument, Bay Capital contends that the bylaws themselves are ambiguous and that the advance notice provision must be read to mean that Bay Capital need only be a stockholder of record as of the record date for the annual meeting, which is July 29, 2019. The relevant language states "nominations for the election of directors may be made by the Board or by any stockholder who is a holder of record of shares of Common Stock ... at the time of giving of the notice of nomination ... and who is entitled to vote for the election of directors. Any stockholder of record entitled to vote for the election of directors at a meeting may nominate persons for election as directors only if timely written notice of such stockholder's intent to make such a nomination is given."

Effectively, as I read it, this
language imposes three requirements: first, notice
must be given timely; second, the stockholder must be
a record holder at the time this notice is given; and,
third, the stockholder must be entitled to vote for
the election of directors at the annual meeting, which
requires that the stockholder own shares as of the

1 record date.

Bay Capital's feigned confusion focuses on the last two requirements. As I understand it, Bay Capital argues that the fact that the stockholder must own shares as of the record date renders ambiguous the requirement that the stockholder be a record holder when giving notice, but I do not see any ambiguity in the two separate requirements. Read properly, they are two separate requirements, one for when the nominating stockholder must be a record holder and one establishing voting status. The last requirement does not obviate the former.

As its third argument, Bay Capital contends that this Court should require the chair of the board of directors of the company to exercise his discretion to acknowledge and accept the nomination, even though the nomination was untimely. For this proposition, Bay Capital relies heavily on Delaware's public policy favoring the stockholder franchise, liberally quoting cases articulating that policy. But Bay Capital makes no effort to apply the facts or holdings of those cases to this dispute.

Needless to say, not even Delaware's strong public policy favoring the stockholder

franchise will save Bay Capital from its dilatory conduct. Bay Capital blew the deadline. It then made up excuses for doing so. No record evidence suggests that the company is in any way at fault for that mistake. If this Court required the company to accept the nomination in these circumstances, advance notice requirements would have little meaning under Delaware law.

Belatedly, Bay Capital argued in its reply brief that the defendant should be viewed as at fault for Bay Capital's failure to meet the record holder deadline. Bay Capital primarily contends that on June 27, the company had the stock transfer company, Computershare, "running around" to confirm that Bay Capital was not a stockholder of record. This distracted Computershare, according to Bay Capital, when Computershare on that day should have been undertaking Bay Capital's request to become a stockholder of record.

In support of this theory, Bay Capital points to a string of email exchanges between Computershare and the company. Those emails do not support Bay Capital's position. The exchanges reflect that around the close of business on June 27, the

company asked Computershare for a list of record holders. The company's request was generic, did not single out Bay Capital, but rather asked generally for the holder list.

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The company did express urgency, which is unsurprising, given the board meeting set for June 28. Between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. that night, the company received a list which did not identify Bay Capital as a stockholder of record. The company then asked Computershare to confirm the list's accuracy, which Computershare did. The June 28 email chain concluded with the Computershare representative stating that "it turns out that this was the transaction that had everyone running around yesterday."

Bay Capital argues that the reference to "running around" described Computershare's reaction to the company's request for a list of record holders, which occurred 18 minutes before the close of business. More likely, "running around" described Computershare's efforts to respond to Bay Capital's demand made on June 27. Indeed, other evidence of record suggests that that is the case. In any event, I do not view potential distraction for 18 minutes of Computershare's day as the reason for why Bay Capital

blew the deadline.

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Plaintiff also argues that the company was motivated to thwart Bay Capital's efforts because Mr. Huseby held what Bay Capital describes as a "personal animus" toward Mr. Suri. The record reflects that Mr. Huseby did not want to work for Mr. Suri. We don't know why. Maybe he disliked him personally, as Bay Capital suggests. Maybe there were other reasons, including business reasons. Whatever the reasons, there is no basis for imputing this possible personal animus to the entire company, and certainly no facts suggesting that this supposed animus caused Bay Capital to miss the relevant deadline.

In short, Bay Capital has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits at a final hearing. And because Bay Capital has not made a showing sufficient to support the first element, I need not address irreparable harm or a balance of the equities. Bay Capital's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

There is one more order of business, and that concerns Bay Capital's litigation conduct. I must say, a red flag was raised at the start when,

after seeking expedition, Bay Capital argued against
the hearing date I ultimately set because it
conflicted with Mr. Suri's travel schedule.

4 Expedited proceedings are unique. 5 They are only ordered upon a showing of good cause. 6 They require this Court to push aside all other 7 casework and devote substantial resources to the needs 8 of the litigants that have demonstrated that good 9 cause. A plaintiff requesting this reaction from the 10 Court must be willing to undertake the same efforts. 11 I explained this in so many words during the 12 scheduling conference. The message was clear. 13 Mr. Suri needed to make himself available for 14 expedited discovery.

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Capital got the message. I reviewed Mr. Suri's deposition transcript. As I stated earlier, the conduct was not optimal. After making defense counsel fly to London to depose him, Mr. Suri showed up a half hour late, left in the middle of the deposition for over two and a half hours to attend personal appointments scheduled that same day, and then unilaterally terminated the deposition when it suited him. He was evasive and obstructive in his responses,

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ultimately going as far as to say that the deposition was an "accommodation" to the defendants. This, of course, ignores the fact that it was Mr. Suri who instigated this lawsuit and requested expedition in the first place.
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The defendants argue that Mr. Suri's conduct supports a finding of unclean hands that independently requires this Court to reject the preliminary injunction motion. I do not decide that issue, and I also have not been asked to determine whether this litigation conduct warrants fee shifting. That's still an open issue. Still I'd be remiss if I didn't state that the conduct concerned me and that I expect more of litigants in this Court.

Finally, the company has some issues with the proxy language, and although Bay Capital's efforts to exploit those issues failed today, the company should not view this ruling as an endorsement of that language.

With that, Counsel, are there any questions?

MR. BELLEW: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. OFFENHARTZ: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I know it's hard to get up to speed in a short amount of time. I appreciate that it was hard work on your parts. We are adjourned for the day, and I hope you have a good summer; the rest of the summer anyway. Thank you. (Court adjourned at 5:08 p.m.) 

## CERTIFICATE

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3 I, JULIANNE LaBADIA, Official Court 4 Reporter for the Court of Chancery of the State of 5 Delaware, Registered Diplomate Reporter, Certified 6 Realtime Reporter, and Delaware Notary Public, do 7 hereby certify the foregoing pages numbered 3 through 8 29, contain a true and correct transcription of the 9 proceedings as stenographically reported by me at the hearing before the Vice Chancellor of the State of 10 11 Delaware, on the date therein indicated, as revised by 12 the Vice Chancellor.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at Wilmington this 15th day of August, 2019.

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/s/ Julianne LaBadia

Julianne LaBadia
Official Court Reporter
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
Delaware Notary Public